Password attacks dropped by 26% year-on-year, yet adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing and token theft more than doubled in the first half of 2026.
That sharp contrast sits at the heart of Microsoft’s latest threat intelligence study, Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2026: Decoding Emergence. While the decline in brute-force and password-spray attacks proves that basic multifactor authentication (MFA) and early passkey adoption are raising the bar, threat actors have not slowed down, but rather moved up the stack.
For security leaders, the takeaway is clear: ticking the compliance box for "MFA enabled" no longer stops modern phishing. True business resilience requires phishing-resistant authentication, strict privilege boundaries, and airtight control over the entire identity lifecycle.
Having MFA Is Not the Same as Resisting Phishing
Traditional MFA, such as SMS one, time passcodes, authenticator app codes, or mobile push notifications, certainly makes a stolen password harder to exploit on its own. However, these methods share a critical flaw: they still rely on human vigilance to spot a fake login prompt.
Modern phishing kits no longer just harvest usernames and passwords; they act as real-time reverse proxies. When an employee is tricked into signing in through a convincing lookalike site, the attacker relays the credentials and the traditional MFA verification straight to the legitimate service. Once the authentication succeeds, the criminal intercepts the resulting authenticated session token, bypassing the login screen entirely.
As Microsoft notes, attackers are increasingly focused on hijacking active sessions rather than stealing static passwords.Even without a proxy site, attackers routinely use social engineering to persuade fatigued employees into reading out a verification code or approving an unexpected push notification.
The critical question every security team must ask: Can our current authentication method be relayed or approved through a phishing site? If the answer is yes, your environment remains exposed.
Why Microsoft Recommends Passkeys Over Legacy MFA
To break the session-hijacking cycle, Microsoft’s report points squarely toward passkeys and FIDO2 authentication.
Unlike a six-digit code that a user can accidentally type into a fraudulent domain, passkeys use public-key cryptography to bind a credential strictly to the legitimate service origin it was created for. If an employee lands on a lookalike phishing site, the cryptographic handshake simply will not execute, regardless of how convincing the fake webpage looks.
This shifts a critical security decision out of the user’s hands and embeds it directly into the authentication protocol.Security awareness training remains essential, but your organisation’s defence against credential phishing no longer depends on whether a busy employee notices a subtle typo in a URL.
Phishing Resistance Must Cover the Entire Workforce
Passkeys can be stored on smartphones, laptops, or dedicated physical FIDO2 security keys, and can be synced across ecosystems or bound to a single hardware device depending on user roles and risk profiles.
Historically, many organisations reserved hardware-bound FIDO2 keys for executives and IT administrators. Microsoft’s incident-response data shows why that approach leaves the door wide open: modern breaches frequently begin with the compromise of an ordinary employee’s account. From that initial foothold, attackers pivot to extract credentials for applications, service accounts, and other non-human identities, rapidly escalating privileges toward widespread data theft. Protecting every human endpoint is now essential to protecting your infrastructure.
Attackers Will Look for Another Way In
Hardening the daily login screen is only half the battle. In Decoding Emergence, Microsoft warns that as primary sign-in methods become phishing-resistant, attackers deliberately target the weakest edges of the identity lifecycle: new-hire onboarding and account recovery.
If an organisation deploys passkeys for daily logins, yet still relies on an SMS code or a personal email link to enrol a new employee, or to reset a locked-out user's credentials, that is not eliminating the vulnerability but rather moving it.
A phishing-resistant login method cannot protect an account if an attacker intercepts the initial enrolment code and registers their own device first. Nor does it help if a convincing caller can persuade the IT service desk to bypass strong verification and issue a temporary access pass using weak knowledge-based checks.
What Organisations Should Do Now
Closing these gaps requires moving from piecemeal MFA policies to an end-to-end phishing-resistant strategy. Security and identity teams can start with three practical priorities:
Audit your authentication footprint: Identify which user groups, legacy protocols, and cloud applications still rely on phishable MFA methods like SMS, voice calls, or standard push notifications.
Stress-test onboarding and recovery workflows: Map out every step required to register a first-time user or replace a lost authenticator. Eliminate fallback paths that rely on weak verification codes or unverified service desk resets.
Contain the blast radius of a single account: Review role-based access controls and test whether compromising a standard user account exposes shared secrets, application tokens, or excessive administrative privileges.
Solving the Last-Mile Deployment and Recovery Gap
For organisations running on Microsoft Entra ID, rolling out hardware-based FIDO2 security keys across the entire workforce is one of the most reliable ways to cut off token-theft attack chains. However, the operational hurdle has traditionally been getting those keys securely into the right hands without falling back on weak onboarding codes.
This is where SpearID® Now streamlines the transition. By enabling pre-registered FIDO2 tokens to be physically delivered and handed directly to verified employees, organisations can deploy phishing-resistant authentication at scale, eliminating the insecure enrolment gap from day one.
Consistency Across the Lifecycle Is the Next Frontier
Microsoft’s 2026 findings confirm that stronger authentication is actively reshaping attacker behaviour. Passwords are losing their value, and legacy MFA is struggling to keep pace with session-theft tactics.
By pairing phishing-resistant FIDO2 credentials with secure pre-registration, hardened recovery procedures, and tighter privilege controls, organisations can ensure that identity security holds firm, not just at sign-in, but across the entire lifecycle of every account.
Source: Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2026: Decoding Emergence